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THE POLITICS BEHIND FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 413, 414, AND 415
I. INTRODUCTION
Our judiciary recognizes that a person's character, when
used as propensity evidence, can be overwhelmingly prejudi-
cial.1 Such evidence can blind jury members, preventing
them from reaching a conclusion based on the merits of the
case before them.2 The exclusion of character evidence, based
on its potential to prejudice the person about whom it is be-
ing admitted, conflicts with the general doctrine that a jury
should reach an independent judgment based on the merits of
the case presented to it.3 Therefore, character evidence is
generally excluded when offered to show an individual acted
in conformity with a certain trait.4 This exclusion has devel-
oped through the common law5 and has been codified in the
Federal Rules of Evidence.6
However, on July 9, 1995, three new amendments to the
Federal Rules of Evidence became effective7 that changed this
well-established rule of exclusion.8 The purpose of these
amendments, Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415, is to allow
instances of prior sexual misconduct to be admissible against
a defendant in a sexual assault case.9 Specifically, the rules
allow a prosecutor, or a plaintiff in a civil matter, to present
evidence of a defendant's prior sexually assaultive behavior
in order to establish an inference that the defendant has a
propensity to commit such acts. 10 Such evidence leads to the
inference that the defendant acted in conformity with that
trait in the case at bar."
Since their proposal before Congress, these new amend-
1. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
7. FED. R. EVID. 413-415 judicial app.
8. See FED. R. EVID. 413-415.
9. FED. R. EVID. 413-415 judicial app.
10. Id.
11. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948).
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ments have been the subject of constant debate." The propo-
nents of the new rules state that they are helpful tools in the
prosecution of a very serious criminal problem. 3 The oppo-
nents, on the other hand, state that the rules recklessly dis-
regard the strong policy behind the exclusion of such evi-
dence and that they infringe on the defendant's right to a fair
trial. 4 The effects of these new rules are just beginning to be
seen as they are analyzed in published judicial opinions."
This comment addresses the weaknesses behind Rules
413, 414, and 415, both politically 6 and substantively. 7 It
emphasizes the inappropriate means through which the rules
were enacted, the poor manner in which they were drafted,
and the weak substantive foundation on which they are
based." By illustrating the legal quagmires that the new
amendments inevitably will cause, this comment ultimately
proposes that the rules either be significantly amended or re-
pealed."9
The following section, Part II, discusses the background
of the federal law regarding the admissibility of character
evidence prior to the enactment of the new rules.2' This sec-
tion also explains the scope and policies behind Rules 413,
414, and 415. Part III identifies the main problem of the
rules" and Part IV addresses the political"' and substantive
2 4
weaknesses of the new rules, respectively.
II. BACKGROUND
This background is divided into two main sections. The
first section discusses the scope and common law history of
12. Debra Sherman Tedeschi, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: Redistributing
"The Credibility Quotient," 57 U. PIrT. L. REV. 107, 108 (1995).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See generally United States v. Roberts, 88 F.3d 872 (10th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Jackson, No. 95-388, 1996 WL 444968, at *1 (D. Or. July 22,
1996).
16. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
18. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
19. See discussion infra Part V.
20. See discussion infra Part II.
21. See discussion infra Part II.
22. See discussion infra Part III.
23. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
24. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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Federal Rules of Evidence 403, 404, and 405.25 These are the
three main rules generally excluding character evidence in
trials. 6 The second section discusses the scope and legisla-
tive history of the newly enacted Federal Rules of Evidence
413, 414, and 415, the three new rules permitting certain
character evidence to be admissible in sexual assault cases.27
A. Federal Rules of Evidence 403, 404, and 405
1. The Scope of Rules 403, 404, and 405
In 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.28 This enactment codified the federal common law
which had developed from several centuries of both American
and English jurisprudence. 9 The rules provide the federal
court system with uniformity in deciding the admissibility of
evidence and act as a model code system on which the major-
ity of the states have designed their individual laws of evi-
dence. 6 The three federal rules which are the most applica-
ble when considering the admissibility of character evidence
are Rules 403, 404, and 405."1
a. Federal Rule of Evidence 403
Rule 403 is a general rule applicable to all forms of evi-
dence.32 It gives a judge discretion in determining what evi-
dence is admissible based on the evidence's probative and
prejudicial values.3 The rule requires the judge to weigh the
probative value of evidence against such factors as: (1) the
danger of the evidence causing undue prejudice to the party
seeking its exclusion;34 (2) the danger of the evidence confus-
25. See discussion infra Part II.A.
26. See discussion infra Part II.A.
27. See discussion infra Part I.B.
28. FED. R. EVID. judicial app.
29. 139 CONG. REC. S15072 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Biden (D-Del.)).
30. FED. R. EVID. judicial app.
31. See infra notes 33, 42, 52 and accompanying text.
32. FED R. EVID. 403 ('Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
33. FED R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
34. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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ing the jury as to the issues of the case;35 (3) the danger of the
evidence generally misleading the jury;' 6 or (4) the danger of
the presentation of the evidence causing an undue delay or
waste of time. 7 If the judge finds the probative value of the
offered evidence to be substantially outweighed by any of the
above-listed dangers, he or she may exclude that evidence.38
This rule is fundamental in the laws of evidence and is
strongly supported by case law.39 Its purpose is to prevent a
jury from making inaccurate judgments based on emotion
and to ensure an orderly, efficient, and fair process of trial.4"
b. Federal Rule of Evidence 404
Federal Rule of Evidence 404 addresses the admissibility
of character evidence.41 The rule is divided into two parts.42
The first part establishes a general rule stating that charac-
ter evidence is not admissible as propensity evidence, with
three exceptions: (1) evidence of the character of the accused
or the victim may be admitted by the accused; (2) evidence of
35. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
38. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
39. See Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1981).
40. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
41. FED. R. EVID. 404. Rule 404 states:
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or
a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of charac-
ter offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecu-
tion to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peaceful-
ness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to
rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness,
as provided in rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepa-
ration, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,
provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a crimi-
nal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the
general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Id.
42. Id.
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the character of the accused may be admitted by the prosecu-
tion as rebuttal evidence; and (3) character evidence may be
admitted to discredit a witness.43
In court, issues regarding a person's character can arise
in one of two ways. The character evidence is either direct,
where the person's character is a main issue, or circumstan-
tial, where the evidence is suggestive of a particular infer-
ence.44 For example, a plaintiffs truthful character is a direct
issue when a defendant is attempting to defend a claim of
defamation. Yet, a defendant's violent character is circum-
stantial when offered to show that the defendant is the initial
aggressor in a battery. 45 Rule 404, generally excluding char-
acter evidence, is only applicable to instances where the evi-
dence is circumstantial.46
Therefore, according to Rule 404, evidence of a person's
character is admissible only if: (1) the issue of that person's
character is direct or; (2) it falls within the rule's enumerated
exceptions.47 However, once it has been determined that
character evidence may be admissible, there are also limits
as to what type of evidence is available to establish the
proposition.48  Rule 405 addresses what types of character
evidence can be admitted under such circumstances.
49
c. Federal Rule of Evidence 405
Rule 405 recognizes the three evidentiary ways in which
one can show character-by reputation, opinion, or specific
instances of prior conduct.5" Character evidence provided
43. Id.
44. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
49. FED. R. EVID. 405.
50. Id. Rule 405 states:
(a) Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character
or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by
testimony as to reputationor by testimony in the form of an opinion.
On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific in-
stances of conduct.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which character or a trait
of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or
defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person's
conduct.
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through opinion or reputation is always acceptable, assuming
Rule 404 has been satisfied.5" However, evidence of one's
prior conduct to establish character is only admissible when
the character issue is direct." Thus, according to Rules 404
and 405, the only occasion when specific instances of conduct
may be admitted as character evidence is where character is
a central issue to the case.5" If one's character is not a central
issue to the case, but character evidence is admissible due to
another enumerated exception, the type of evidence admissi-
ble is limited to evidence of reputation or opinion.' Prior
conduct is not admissible.
2. The Policies Supporting Rules 403, 404, and 405
While Rules 403, 404, and 405 have only existed since
1975,"5 their substantive bases have long been established
within the common law.56 The Supreme Court has specifi-
cally stated that character evidence can persuade a jury to in-
fer a defendant acted in conformity with his character on the
particular occasion when there would be little or no corrobo-
rating evidence.57
If there is an exceptional situation where character evi-
dence is admissible, there are established policies against the
admission of specific instances of prior conduct as a means of
establishing the character in question. 8 Specific instances of
conduct are not inadmissible because they lack probative
value. 5 Rather, in establishing character, such evidence is
extremely relevant and far more informative than evidence of
one's reputation or opinion.6' However, evidence of prior con-
duct is considered extremely prejudicial and may tend to
mislead the jury in considering the factual issues before it."'
According to the advisory committee's notes on Rule 405, "[o]f
the three methods of proving character provided by the rule,
evidence of specific instances of conduct is the most convinc-
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See supra notes 41, 50 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 41, 50 and accompanying text.
55. FED. R. EVID. judicial app.
56. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
57. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note.
58. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
59. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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ing. At the same time it possesses the greatest capacity to
arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to consume
time."62
3. Distinguishing Between Character Evidence and
Prior Acts
As discussed above, evidence of specific instances of prior
conduct to establish character can be both probative and
prejudicial.6' As a result, such evidence is generally excluded
based upon a Rule 403 balancing test. 4 However, there is
another available method which may be used to admit prior
instances of conduct.65
The available method derives from Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b).66  This rule begins by recognizing that prior
crimes, wrongs, or acts cannot be admitted as character evi-
dence.67 Yet, once this is established, the rule goes on to ex-
plain that prior instances of conduct, such as crimes or
wrongs, may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, knowledge, preparation, and intent.68
Under this exception, evidence of prior acts is admissible
because it is distinguishable from character evidence.69 While
the prior acts are admissible as circumstantial evidence, the
inferences that a jury is expected to draw differ significantly
from those a jury is normally expected to draw with circum-
stantial evidence." Evidence to be taken purely as character
evidence is to be considered by the jury as a means to deter-
mine the character of a person and whether the actions in
question are consistent with that character.71 The jury must
ask: What kind of person is the accused?72 However, when
the evidence is admitted through the Rule 404(b) exception,
the jury is no longer forced to consider the character of the
62. Id.
63. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
64. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee's note.
65. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.a-b.
66. See supra note 41.
67. See supra note 41.
68. See supra note 41.
69. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Small Contribution to the Debate over the
Proposed Legislation Abolishing the Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex Of-
fense Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1125, 1130-36 (1993).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1137.
72. Id.
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accused."3 Instead, the inferences involve the objective con-
sideration of how past actions reflect upon the mens rea (or
guilty mind) of the accused.
B. Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415
1. The Scope of Rules 413, 414, and 415
The three new amendments to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence are included in Section XXXII of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 1 This act was
signed into law by President William J. Clinton on Septem-
ber 13, 1994 and became effective on July 9, 1995." The en-
actment of these rules has caused a great deal of controversy
among the judiciary because of the radical changes imposed
on the established laws of evidence in regards to character
evidence, such as Rules 403, 404, and 405.6
Rules 413, 414, and 415 allow specific instances of prior
conduct to be admissible as character evidence against the
accused in sexual assault cases." Rules 413 and 414 are spe-
cific to criminal cases of sexual assault and child molestation,
73. Id.
74. FED. R. EVID. 413-415 judicial apps.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. FED. R. EVID. 413-415. Rules 413, 414, and 415 read in pertinent part:
Rule 413. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases.
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense
of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another of-
fense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered
for its bearing on any matter to which is relevant.
FED. R. EVID. 413.
Rule 414. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation Cases.
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense
of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission ofanother
offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be con-
sidered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
FED. R. EVID. 414.
Rule 415. Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases Concerning Sexual
Assault or Child Molestation.
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predi-
cated on a party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an of-
fense of sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of that party's
commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault or child
molestation is admissible and may be considered as provided inRule
413 and Rule 414 of these rules.
FED. R. EVID. 415.
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respectively."8 Rule 415 applies to civil cases.79 For example,
if a defendant was charged with rape, evidence of a prior
conviction, charge, or accusation of rape may be admissible to
establish an inference that the defendant is a rapist."
2. The Legislative History of Rules 413, 414, and 415
The purposes of these rules are best understood by not-
ing their legislative history. The amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence were initially proposed to Congress in the
Women's Equal Opportunity Act bill in February of 1991.81
The two main supporters of the amendments were Represen-
tative Susan Molinari and Senator Robert Dole.8" The
amendments were rejected, but later reintroduced in the
Sexual Assault Prevention Act bills of the 102d and 103d
Congresses.83 The amendments gained more support through
the 102d Congress and were added to a violent crime bill
supported by President George Bush.84 Finally, "the Senate
passed the proposed rules on November 5, 1993 by a vote of
75 to 19 in a crime bill amendment offered by Senator Dole." 8
According to the Rules Enabling Act, originally enacted
in 1934, a Judicial Reviewing Conference may have the op-
portunity to review legislation proposed by Congress.86 Such
a review is intended to provide Congress with feedback from
the judicial branch as to the anticipated results of the pro-
posed legislation's enactment. Furthermore, the Rules
Enabling Act is also intended to provide the judiciary with an
78. FED. R. EVID. 413-14.
79. FED. R. EVID. 415.
80. See id.
81. 139 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari (R-N.Y.)).
"Senator Dole and I initially proposed this reform in February of 1991
in the Women's Equal Opportunity Act bill, and we later re-introduced
it in the Sexual Assault Prevention Act bills of the 102d and 103d Con-
gresses ... and was included in President Bush's violent crime bill of
that Congress, D. 635."
Id.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). The Rules Enabling
Act reads, in pertinent part: "The Supreme Court shall have the power to pre-
scribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in
the United States district courts .... Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or
modify any substantive right." Id.
87. Id. judicial app.
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opportunity to assist in the drafting of laws that it will later
be applying.8 Ultimately, the goal of the Rules Enabling Act
is to encourage the cooperation of two branches of the federal
government when performing closely related duties.89 While
this rule does not adjust the enumerated powers of the indi-
vidual branches, the intent is clear-both branches could be
more effective if there were less conflicts between them.90
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 did not go
through this procedure.9 Congress bypassed the normal
enabling rules and directly enacted the amendments through
the crime bill.9" According to Congressman Hughes:
[The] existing rule-making process involves a minimum of
six levels of scrutiny or stages of formal review. This has
gone through none. This is an amendment offered on the
floor of the Senate after about twenty minutes' debate,
without very much thought, and it is procedurally and
substantively flawed.93
Specifically, in section 329035 of the crime bill, Congress
provided that "[tihe Rules Enabling Act shall not apply to the
recommendations made by the Judicial Conference pursuant
to this section."
94
As a compromise, Congress announced it would recon-
sider the legislation if the Judicial Reviewing Conference
made a timely objection.95 Congress requested that the Judi-
cial Conference submit a report reviewing the new rules
within 150 days after the bill's enactment on September 13,
1994.96 Congress then stated that once it received the report,
it would review the recommendations.97 If the recommenda-
tions were in favor of the legislation, the rules would become
effective thirty days after the report was received. 9 If the
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
91. Denis F. McLaughlin, Rule Changes Pending in Congress: The Shape of
Things to Come?, AM. LAW. NEWSPAPER GROUP, INC., Feb. 19, 1996, at 11-12.
92. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 320935, 108 Stat. 2135 (1994).
93. 140 CONG. REC. H8968, H8990 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement by
Congressman Hughes (D-N.J.)).
94. Id.
95. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, § 320935, 108 Stat. 2135 (1994).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
970 [Vol. 38
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recommendations were against the legislation, the rules
would become effective 150 days after the report was re-
ceived.99 The purpose of this delay was to provide Congress
an additional period of time to review the legislation.
On February 9, 1995, pursuant to the legislation, the Ju-
dicial Conference Committee sent a report to Congress re-
garding the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 100  The Committee's report was clear: Congress
should reconsider the substantive bases of Rules 413, 414,
and 415.101 In comprising its report, the Judicial Conference
Committee created several groups which reviewed how the
legislation would effect specific areas of the law, such as
criminal law and the laws of evidence. 102 Further, the Com-
mittee solicited comments from hundreds of members of the
legal community.' The results of these smaller committees
all supported the ultimate conclusion of the report delivered
to Congress.!0
For example, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules
reported an unanimous decision, but for one dissenting vote
by the representative of the Department of Justice.' The
report stated:
The advisory committee believed that the concerns ex-
pressed by Congress and embodied in new Evidence Rules
413, 414, and 415 are already adequately addressed in the
existing Federal Rules of Evidence. In particular, Evi-
dence Rule 404(b) now allows the admission of evidence
against a criminal defendant of the commission of prior
crimes, wrongs, or acts for specified purposes, including to
show intent, plan, motive, preparation, identity, knowl-
edge, or absence of mistake or accident.1
6
The report went on to recognize the unusual unanimity of the
members, composed of over forty judges, practicing lawyers,
99. Id.
100. FED. R. EVID. 413 congressional committee action note.
101. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JU-
DICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER
EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES § III (1995) [hereinafter
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT].
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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and academians, in viewing the new rules as undesirable."0 7
In regards to the comments received from the legal com-
munity, the report stated: "The overwhelming majority of
judges, lawyers, law professors, and legal organizations who
responded opposed new Evidence Rules 413, 414, and 415.
The principle objections expressed were that the rules would
permit the admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence and
contained numerous drafting problems not intended by their
authors."'
In its report, the Judicial Review Committee seemed to
note the unusual fervor in which Congress was attempting to
pass its legislation.19 While Congress had stated that it
would review the recommendations of the Committee, it
seemed clear that it did not intend to repeal the rules.110
Thus, in hopes of having some affect, the Judicial Committee
also contained a compromise in their report."1 This section
recommended that if Congress refused to repeal the new
rules, then Rules 413, 414, and 415 should be incorporated
into Federal Rule of Evidence 404.1
Because the report was not in favor of the amendments,
the enactment of the rules was postponed 150 days. Theo-
retically, this provided time for Congress to review the report
and reconsider the opinions of the judiciary. 14 Yet, the 150
days passed and Rules 413, 414, and 415 became effective as
originally drafted."'
III. PROBLEM IDENTIFIED
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 clearly con-
flict with established evidentiary rules as to character evi-
dence and specific instances of prior conduct."6 Since their
enactment, the rules have been the subject of constant debate
due to the confusion they cause;"7 Rules 403-405 generally
107. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 101, § III.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. § IV.
112. Id.
113. McLaughlin, supra note 91, at 11-12.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See discussion supra Part II.A.
117. FED. R. EVID. 413-415 judicial app.
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forbid character evidence while Rules 413-415 permit it."8
Thus, two pertinent questions arise: (1) do the Federal Rules
of Evidence, taken as a whole, allow prior instances of spe-
cific conduct to be admitted as character evidence in sexual
assault cases?; and (2) what were the motivating factors be-
hind Congress' enactment of these rules?
IV. ANALYSIS
An understanding of the above material makes the fol-
lowing arguments against Rules 413, 414, and 415 much
more clear. The arguments are divided into two main
parts."9 Part A addresses the political motivations behind
the new rules as well as the poor drafting methods used by
Congress in creating them.12° Part B addresses the substan-
tive problems with the rules."' The arguments will show
that Rules 413-415 were not only enacted carelessly and im-
properly, but also demonstrate that their substantive basis is
both confusing and conflicting with centuries of developed ju-
risprudence.1
22
A. The Politics of Rules 413, 414, and 415
Congress appeared to take several steps to ensure Rules
413, 414, and 415 were enacted: (1) Congress made sure the
Rules Enabling Act specifically did not apply to the legisla-
tion; 12 3 (2) Congress requested a reviewing report from the
Judicial Conference, but evidently paid it no attention
throughout the 150 day review period; 24 and (3) Congress not
only ignored the clear recommendations from the Judicial
Conference, but also from the responding members of the
general legal community.' The natural question that follows
is: Why would Congress do this?
The new rules are a reflection of political trends.' In
118. See discussion supra Part II.A.
119. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
120. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
121. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
122. See discussion infra Parts IV-V.
123. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
126. See McLaughlin, supra note 91, at 11-12; Sara Sun Beale, Prior Similar
Acts in Prosecutions for Rape and Child Sex Abuse, 4 CRIM. L.F., 307 (1993);
Imwinkelried, supra note 69, at 1129.
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enacting Rules 413-415, Congress appears to be more inter-
ested in demonstrating to the country that legislation which
addresses current political issues can be enacted, rather than
provide the judiciary with effective laws.'27
During the early 1990s, two highly publicized cases fo-
cused public attention on the prosecution of sexual assaults,
and their outcomes called for political action.'28 Additionally,
women's political influence was growing stronger.29 Debates
over a woman's involvement in the military and in the
working world had reached an all-time high, and the nation
was learning the power of the term "sexual harassment."'
There were also public outcries at dramatically increasing
rape statistics."'
This was also the time when celebrities such as William
Kennedy Smith and boxer Mike Tyson were prosecuted for
rape."' In the end, Kennedy was acquitted and Tyson was
convicted. These disparate outcomes were a result of at least
one major evidentiary distinction between the two cases."'
While in both cases the prosecution offered evidence of prior
sexual misconduct against the defendants," in Kennedy's
case, the judge excluded the prior misconduct as prejudicial
character evidence while in Tyson's case, the judge admitted
it."' These two otherwise unrelated rulings demonstrated to
the public the power of character evidence in sexual assault
cases.1
36
These political and legal events combined to influence
Congress to produce legislation which would focus on the po-
litically charged concerns of sexual assault."7 The result was
Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: a set of rules that Con-
gress could present to the public as its attempt to get tough
127. Beale, supra note 126, at 307-08.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 309.
130. Id. at 311.
131. McLaughlin, supra note 91, at 11-12. While statistics demonstrated an
increase in the number of rapes, the results implied an increase in the number
of reported rapes rather than an actual increase in the number of assaults. Id.
132. Imwinkelried, supra note 69, at 1126-27.
133. Id. at 1127.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1128.
137. Beale, supra note 126, at 307-08.
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on crime.13
Unfortunately, it seems apparent that by enacting Rules
413-415, Congress was more interested in appeasing the po-
litical cries of the public, rather than providing reasonable
legislation.'39 According to statements made by Representa-
tive Molinari, the principal House sponsor of the amend-
ments, 14 Congress intended to implement the legislation, re-
gardless of the Judicial Conference report:
[Congress has] agreed to a temporary deferral of the effec-
tive date of the new rules, pending a report by the Judicial
Conference, in order to accommodate procedural objections
raised by opponents of the reform. However, regardless of
what the Judicial Conference may recommend, the new
rules will take effect within at most 300 days of the en-
actment of this legislation .... 4
Additionally, the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 included a legislative surge of
striking attacks against defendants accused of sexual
assaults. For example, an amendment to Federal Rule of
Evidence 412 (the Rape Shield Law) was also included with
Rules 413, 414, and 415.142 While Rules 413-415 focus on the
admissibility of a defendant's prior acts, Rule 412 focuses on
the inadmissibility of the victim's prior acts.' 3  The defense
most often used by defendants charged with rape is consent
by the victim.4 4 This defense is substantiated by introducing
evidence of the sexual history of the victim to establish his or
her propensity towards promiscuity.' 45  Therefore, with the
138. McLaughlin, supra note 91, at 14.
139. See id. at 15.
140. See FED. R. EVID. 413-415 congressional discussion notes.
141. 139 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (1994).
142. FED. R. EVID. 412. Rule 412 reads in pertinent part:
Sex Offense Cases; Relevance of Alleged Victim's Past Sexual Behavior
or Alleged Sexual Predisposition.
(a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible. The following evidence is not
admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged
sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in
other sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predis-
position.
Id.
143. See id.
144. Tedeschi, supra note 12, at 116.
145. Id. at 117.
975
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
combination of these four amendments to the Federal Rules
of Evidence, a defendant accused of sexual assault receives
two striking blows.'46 First, the defendant's main defense
focusing on the victim's promiscuity is practically eliminated;
and, second, more potentially-damaging evidence is available
to the prosecution.1
4
7
Furthermore, since the prosecution of sexual assault
crimes is extremely rare in federal courts,141 it is unclear
what substantive purpose Congress would have for develop-
ing a double-edged attack against people accused of such
crimes. This is yet another reason to presume the main pur-
pose of the legislation was to relay a political message.
Finally, if Congress was motivated by something other
than politics, such as the desire to draft clear and reliable
laws, it would not have supported the enactment of such
poorly drafted legislation14 ' As written, Rules 413, 414, and
415 directly contradict Rules 404 and 405.1° Assuming that
each rule, as an independent Federal Rule of Evidence, is
weighed equally, which set of rules apply?
One may assume that Congress intended the new rules
to act as exceptions to Rules 404 and 405. However, if this is
the case, why draft them as separate rules? The Judicial
Conference Report noted this inconsistency and suggested
that if Congress insisted upon passing this type of legislation,
then it should do so by creating an amendment to Rule 404.1"
The Conference report went so far as to include a suggestive
draft of an amended Rule 404 that contained the same sub-
stantive law of the new rules.'52 Unfortunately, Congress de-
cided not to act on these recommendations.'53
Further, Rules 413, 414, and 415 are unclear as to
whether they are mandatory rules, or if Rule 403 still ap-
plies.1 14 As drafted, the new rules state that character evi-
dence "is admissible."'55 Congress chose to use this vague
146. Id.
147. Tedeschi, supra note 12, at 118.
148. Beale, supra note 126, at 309.
149. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 101, § III.
150. See supra notes 41, 50, 77 and accompanying text.
151. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 101, § IV.
152. Id.
153. McLaughlin, supra note 91, at 15.
154. Tedeschi, supra note 12, at 115.
155. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 101, § III.
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phrase as opposed to the common "may be admissible"
(implying judicial discretion through Rule 403)156 or "shall be
admissible" (implying mandatory admission of the evi-
dence). 15 7 Again, it is unclear which way the rules should be
interpreted."' While the floor statements of Representative
Molinari imply that Rule 403 is still applicable to the new
rules, the fact that the rules do not expressly state whether
Rule 403 is applicable is yet another example of the poor
manner in which the legislation was drafted.'59
It is important that Congress create legislation which re-
flects the needs of our country.6 ° As problems present them-
selves, Congress may decide to create new legislation as a
solution. It is this flexibility that ensures the system's
strength. 6' However, the judiciary must be able to apply this
legislation for this system to be effective.'62 Once Congress
begins creating legislation that is unable to be applied or con-
flicts with other laws, its goals are unobtainable. If this
legislation is in conflict with widely accepted, fundamental
rules, it leads one to conclude that the intent behind the leg-
islation was not to develop an innovative way to solve a
problem. Instead, it appears that the intent of the legislation
was to serve other purposes, such as providing a release for
political pressure." Such legislation is void of substance and
cannot effectively be used by the judiciary.6 ' This is the case
with Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415.
B. The Substantive Flaws of Rules 413, 414, and 415
There are several substantive flaws with the new rules
and the policies which support them.'66 This comment pres-
ents four main arguments against the substance of these
rules. "'67 The first two arguments are founded in the laws of
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 101, § III.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
165. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 101, § III.
166. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 1-4.
167. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 1-4.
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character evidence.'68 The last two address Rules 413-415
and their specific focus on sexual assaults.'69 Each argument
is enough to question the validity of the rules. Therefore,
taken as a whole, these four arguments show that Federal
Rules 413-415 need to either be drastically amended or re-
pealed.17
1. Evidence of Specific Instances of Prior Conduct
Offered to Establish the Character of a Defendant Is
Too Prejudicial, and Therefore Should Not Be
Admissible
The rule establishing character evidence as prejudicial
existed in our system of jurisprudence as common law long
before the creation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 7' The
rule was established through years, even centuries, of judi-
cial experience in both the United States and England.'
Over time, judges consistently found the probative value of
such evidence to be substantially outweighed by its prejudi-
cial effect. 7' As long ago as 1865, Chief Justice Cockburn,
while recognizing the relevance of prior acts on determining
one's character, noted the existence of the common law's ab-
solute rule of exclusion: "it is quite clear that an antecedent
bad character would form quite as reasonable a ground for
the presumption and probability of guilt as previous good
character lays the foundation of innocence, yet you cannot on
the part of the prosecution, go into evidence as to charac-ter. " 174
The general policy underlying the exclusion of character
evidence is the expectation that a defendant will be tried for
what he did and not for who he is. 175 When prior conduct
character evidence is permitted at trial,
the jurors may be tempted to punish the accused for the
other crimes. The temptation may be especially acute
when.., the accused has not as of yet been convicted of
168. See discussion infra Part 1Y.B.1-2.
169. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3-4.
170. See discussion infra Part V.
171. Tedeschi, supra note 12, at 115.
172. Id.
173. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 472 (1948).
174. Id. at 474 n.29.
175. United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 847 (1978).
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and punished for the uncharged crime. The uncharged
misconduct evidence may create the impression that to
date, the accused has unjustly escaped punishment for the
uncharged misdeeds. The jurors may be tempted to rectify
that injustice by punishing the accused now for the un-
charged crimes-even though they have a reasonable
doubt about the accused's guilt of the charged offense.
176
Additionally, this type of evidence,
tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of
what actually happened on the particular occasion. It sub-
tly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and
punish the bad man because of their respective characters
despite what the evidence in the case shows actually hap-
pened.'77
Yet, Congress quickly passed these three new rules,
saying very little about how they contradicted with such an
established rule of evidence as Rule 404.178 Instead of ad-
dressing this controversial issue, proponents of the rules,
such as Senator Dole, focused on policy issues by making
statements as to their necessity in dealing with crime. 9  For
example, during floor hearings Senator Dole stated:
[T]oo often, crucial evidentiary information is thrown out
at trial because of technical evidentiary rulings. This
amendment is designed to clarify the law and make clear
what evidence is admissible, and what evidence is not ad-
missible, in sex crime cases .... [I]f we are really going to
get tough, and if we are really going to try to make certain
that justice is provided for the victim... [I] think we
180
ought to look seriously at [this amendment].
Sexual assaults are serious crimes and it is necessary to
establish deterrents in our legal system to try and prevent
future assaults. Senator Dole's statements regarding the
need to "get tough on crime" are recognized as important.
However, there are several other legal issues that are also
important. For example, it is important that defendants ac-
cused of sexual assault receive a fair trial. 8' It is also impor-
tant that rules of evidence, which are established to ensure
176. Imwinkelried, supra note 69, at 581.
177. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note.
178. McLaughlin, supra note 91, at 11.
179. 139 CONG. REC. S15072-3 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993).
180. Id.
181. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
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that a trial is fair, are not ignored in order to "get tough on
crime. ,8 2
The rules excluding specific instances of prior conduct
when offered as character evidence are important in main-
taining the fairness of trials.'83 When Congress creates leg-
islation ignoring these rules, it indirectly says it is more im-
portant to get tough on crime than to ensure a defendant
receives a fair trial.
2. What About Sexual Assault Crimes Requires Such a
Drastic Change in the Rules of Evidence?
As drafted, Rules 413, 414, and 415 clearly create incon-
sistencies in the admissibility of prior conduct character evi-
dence when trying a defendant on a sexual assault charge as
opposed to another serious crime.8 4 For example, consider a
defendant being prosecuted for the rape and murder of an in-
dividual.'85 The defendant has two prior bad acts, one of
which is a rape, the other a murder. Under these new rules,
the prior rape can be admitted even when offered as pure
character evidence, while the prior murder could not be ad-
mitted without the prosecution showing that it has a non-
propensity purpose.88
Why did Congress single out sexual assaults from other
serious crimes like murder, kidnapping, or narcotics distribu-
tion? As mentioned earlier, the motives seem to be politi-
cal."'87 However, the proponents of the rules had to provide
substantive arguments in their support.'88 Congress provided
three main arguments to justify its actions. First, statistics
showed that the number of sexual assaults in the country
were rising, and, therefore, new laws were necessary to re-
duce the frequency of this crime. 88 Second, sexual assaults
generally take place in private, and, thus, there are few wit-
nesses and little direct evidence available to be used at tri-
als. 9° Therefore, as much available evidence should be re-
182. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
183. See supra notes 32, 41 and accompanying text.
184. Beale, supra note 126, at 315.
185. Imwinkelried, supra note 69, at 1140.
186. Id.
187. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
188. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 101, § III.
189. Tedeschi, supra note 12, at 112.
190. Id.
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viewed by the courts in reaching a verdict.19' Third, people
who sexually assault others are often recidivists and are
more likely to repeat their crimes.192 Their recidivist nature
is probative, and, thus, procedural exceptions should be made
in the prosecution to demonstrate their repetitive, criminal
'93
nature.
Congress' first argument, regarding the statistics of sex-
ual assaults, is flawed due to an inaccurate interpretation of
those statistics.9 First, criminal statistics on murder and
drug trafficking appeared to be increasing at the same rate
as sexual assaults.9 Thus, the fact that sexual assaults had
apparently increased is not a sufficient reason for the crea-
tion of the new rules; by that rationale, character evidence
exceptions should be made for murder and drug trafficking
crimes as well as sexual assaults.' 9 Second, many statisti-
cians believed that the apparent increase in sexual assaults
was due to increased reporting rather than an actual in-
crease in the number of crimes.'97 If this was the case, there
was not a sudden need for laws focusing on sexual assault as
Congress had suggested.9
The second argument provided by Congress is also weak.
While it is true that sexual assaults often take place in pri-
vate, this is also the case for the majority of other crimes.'99
Murder, for example, usually occurs in a private area with
few or no witnesses.' Furthermore, given the inherent na-
ture of murder, even less direct evidence is available because
a main witness is also the victim.'0' If this rationale was one
of the motivating factors in the creation of Rules 413-415,
then once again, this is not sufficient to pass legislation spe-
cializing in sexual assaults.
Lastly, the third argument provided by Congress is
flawed in a manner similar to the first. True, there are sta-
tistics which show that people who commit sexual assaults
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 119.
195. Tedeschi, supra note 12, at 119.
196. McLaughlin, supra note 91, at 14.
197. Tedeschi, supra note 12, at 119.
198. See McLaughlin, supra note 91, at 14.
199. Tedeschi, supra note 12, at 112.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 119-20.
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are recidivists; however, there are other statistics which say
that such people are no more likely to repeat their crimes
than other people who commit serious crimes, such as mur-
derers or drug distributors. °2 Recidivism appears to be asso-
ciated with the general criminal rather than the specific sex-
ual assaulter.0 3
Overall, the arguments that Congress presented do not
support laws which create exceptions for cases involving sex-
ual assaults. Each of the above arguments can be applied to
other equally serious crimes. For example, if the admissibil-
ity of character evidence is justified in sexual assault cases,
why should it not be admissible in murder cases?
3. Our Legal System Has Established Methods to
Accomplish the Same Goal Behind the New Rules
Without Allowing Prejudicial Evidence to Be
Admitted
Rule 404(b) permits evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or
acts" to be admitted when used for purposes other than pro-
pensity evidence, such as proving a defendant's motive,
knowledge, or intent.20 4 However, the list of purposes con-
tained within the rule is not exhaustive.2 5 The list is pre-
ceded by the phrase "such as," implying the list is merely an
example of purposes for which such evidence may be admit-
ted.208 Thus, evidence of prior acts can be admissible for nu-
merous reasons, and a competent prosecutor can often find
some purpose to make sure the proposed evidence is admit-
ted.20 7
As an example, consider the following hypothetical. A
criminal defendant is charged with the illegal possession of
cocaine. The defendant admits to possessing the contraband,
but defends his possession by claiming he did not know that
the powder substance was cocaine. However, the prosecution
has evidence that six months earlier, the defendant was
charged and convicted of possessing cocaine. This evidence of
the defendant's prior conduct would not be admissible as
202. Tedeschi, supra note 12, at 112.
203. See Beale, supra note 126, at 319.
204. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
205. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note.
206. Id.
207. Imwinkelried, supra note 69, at 1135.
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character evidence; the prosecution could not offer the prior
conviction to show the defendant has a propensity to possess
cocaine. On the other hand, the evidence would be admissi-
ble to rebut the defendant's defense of lack of knowledge; the
evidence shows the defendant probably did know that he was
possessing cocaine because of the experience of his prior con-
viction. Therefore, the same evidence may be admissible for
one purpose and not admissible for another. °8
4. The New Rules May Force Judges to Hold Mini-
Trials in Determining the Admissibility of Evidence
Considering the way Rules 413, 414, and 415 were
drafted, it is unclear whether these new rules are discretion-
ary or mandatory.2"9 Strong evidence suggests the rules are
discretionary, and, therefore, Rule 403 still applies. 1' How-
ever, the nature of these new rules goes against the original
intention of Rule 403, and, thus, the problems of application
arise."'
Originally, prior instances of specific conduct, when of-
fered as character evidence, were subject to the Rule 403 bal-
ancing test, weighing the probative and prejudicial values.212
Such evidence was deemed to be substantially more prejudi-
cial than probative, and, thus, the general rule of exclusion
developed.213 However, Congress now asks judges to not only
admit evidence which would have previously been considered
prejudicial, but also to use Rule 403 to do so.214 This is very
confusing, and yet Congress never provided an explanation as
to how this should be done. 15
The question then becomes: To what extent does Rule
403 apply to the new rules? It appears that Congress may be
suggesting that character evidence is generally admissible
unless it is prejudicial in some other manner suggested in
Rule 403.16 Specifically, Rule 403 states that evidence may
208. Id. at 1133.
209. See id.
210. See 140 CONG. REC. H5439 (1993) (statement of Rep. Kyl (R-Ariz.)).
211. See supra notes 32, 77 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 32, 41, 50 and accompanying text; see also FED. R.
EVID. 404-405 advisory committee's notes.
213. See FED. R. EVID. 404-405 advisory committee's notes.
214. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
215. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 101, § III.
216. Id.
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be excluded if its admissibility would confuse the jury as to
the issue of the case, generally mislead the jury, or cause an
undue delay in the trial.217
A closer look at Rule 403 reveals that its applicable lim-
its would still almost always exclude evidence the new rules
are intended to admit.1 8 For example, the new rules allow
evidence of prior sexual assaults by the accused, regardless of
whether the evidence is in the form of a prior conviction, a
criminal charge, or just another person claiming the defen-
dant had previously sexually assaulted him or her."9 The
judge is then required to perform a "new" Rule 403 balancing
test, presuming the prior acts will be admissible, but still
considering its other possible prejudicial effects."2
According to Rule 403, the judge would begin by consid-
ering whether the evidence would have the potential to con-
fuse or mislead the jury as to the issues it is to decide. ' By
its nature, character evidence focuses the attention of the ju-
rors away from the facts supporting the case before them.2 '
Instead, it directs their attention to events that occurred in a
different time and situation."' While such evidence is rele-
vant in establishing the individual's character, it is not rele-
vant to the factual issues supporting the particular case be-
fore the jury.2 4 Therefore, admitting such evidence naturally
either: (1) confuses the jury as to the acts for which the de-
fendant is on trial;225 or (2) misleads the jury to consider cer-
tain factual circumstances that are unrelated to the charge
when reaching a verdict.226 Unfortunately, due to the legisla-
tion's vagueness, it is difficult to know if Rules 413, 414, and
415 were intended to excuse these types of evidentiary preju-
dices. 27
217. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. EVID. 403
advisory committee's note.
219. See supra note 77 and accompanying text; see also JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE REPORT, supra note 101, § II.
220. Id.
221. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. EVID. 403
advisory committee's note.
222. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 101, § III.
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Rule 403 also allows a judge to exclude evidence if its
admittance would cause undue delay within trial. 8 As de-
signed, the new rules have the potential to cause great de-
lays. 9 Consider the following example. A male defendant is
prosecuted for the rape of a woman. During his trial, the
prosecution uses Rule 413 and offers evidence of a prior sex-
ual assault by the defendant. The evidence is used to show
the defendant has a propensity to rape. The evidence is in
the form of a woman who is willing to testify that two years
ago, the defendant raped her. This woman states that she
had never reported her rape to anyone, and that this was the
first time she was speaking publicly about the incident. As a
result, there is no prior charge or conviction of rape against
the defendant. The defendant objects, claiming that such an
event never happened.
According to Rule 403, the judge now must make a ruling
as to the admissibility of this evidence. 23' Before the judge
can decide to admit the evidence, he must conclude that there
is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the
rape actually occurred.231 In order for him to reach such a
conclusion, the judge must consider additional evidence; the
prosecution offering the prior rape will need to provide suffi-
cient evidence to overcome the defendant's defense, and in
turn, the defendant will likely raise new defenses to this
claim.232 The judge will also be expected to consider whether
the circumstances surrounding the two alleged rapes are
similar enough to establish a probative relationship.233 If the
witness was going to testify that she was a friend of the de-
fendant when he raped her, and the defendant was charged
with raping a stranger, are these two situations similar
enough to allow in the evidence? Further, would it make a
difference if the defendant had previously been charged and
tried for the rape, but was found to be not guilty? What if the
witness claims the defendant had raped her, but it occurred
twenty years ago?
228. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. EVID. 403
advisory committee's note.
229. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 101, § III.
230. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
231. See FED. R. EVID. 104.
232. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 101, § III.
233. See FED. R. EVID. 104; See United States v. Roberts, 88 F.3d 872 (10th
Cir. 1996).
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In order for this new evidence of a prior rape to be admit-
ted, the judge would, in essence, need to conduct a mini-trial
to determine its reliability. 34 This would be an extremely
time consuming process. 2 5 A judge could find that admission
of this evidence would cause an undue delay in the trial and,
therefore, exclude the evidence under Rule 403.236 However,
it is difficult for judges to know what factors they should con-
sider when making these admissibility decisions under the
new rules.21 7 For example, should the proximity in time of
alleged sexual assaults be considered in determining the ad-
missibility of evidence?238
Apparently, the proponents of the rule cannot reach an
answer to this question. 39 In 1991, Senator Dole stated: "[A]
lapse of time from the uncharged offense may properly be
considered by the jury for any bearing it may have on the
evidence's probative value, but... there is no justification for
categorically excluding offenses that occurred before some
arbitrary specified temporal limit."2 4° The statement seems
to imply that a judge should not consider proximity in time
when determining if a prior sexual assault should be admit-
ted.241  However, another statement by Senator Dole, two
years later, seems to contradict this.242 In explaining how
Rule 403 may still apply to the new rules, Senator Dole
stated: "I think if somebody is a repeat offender, if you
brought in eight or nine women, for example ... and he had
one offense after another, it would be probative. If it had not
happened for ten years, it would probably not have any
value."243 It is the duty of judges to exclude evidence that
does not have any value, and, therefore, this statement seems
to imply that a judge may consider proximity in time when
making admissibility decisions.244
234. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 101, § III.
235. Id.
236. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
237. See United States v. Roberts, 88 F.3d 872 (10th Cir. 1996).
238. See 139 CONG. REC. S15072-73 (1993) (statement by Sen. Dole (R-
Kan.)).
239. Compare 113 CONG. REC. S15072-3 (1993), with 137 CONG. REC. S3191-
02 (1991).
240. 137 CONG. REC. S3242-02 (1991).
241. See Tedeschi, supra note 12, at 117-18.
242. 139 CONG. REC. S3238-42 (1993).
243. Id.
244. See FED. R. EVID.104; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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In the end, it becomes clear that Rules 413, 414, and 415
are fundamentally inconsistent with Rule 403.245 While Con-
gress claims that Rule 403 is still applicable, neither Con-
gress nor the judiciary seem to understand how. 46 Congress,
as the creators of the new rules, failed to provide the judici-
ary with an explanation as to how they intended Rule 403 to
apply.2 47 This may be because Congress itself is unsure.246
The result is that the judiciary is expected to apply contrast-
ing rules, and one can reasonably expect that, in doing so, the
results would be inconsistent.
V. PROPOSAL
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 should be
drastically amended or repealed. 49 Doing so would rid the
federal legal system of three confusing and inconsistent
rules.25° While the political policies motivating the enactment
of these rules may have been positive, the manner in which
they were enacted and drafted made the attainment of such
goals impossible.25" '
The judiciary strongly disapproves of the amendments
because of their effect on the established rules of evidence, as
well as a defendant's right to receive a fair trial.2 52 As of yet,
the judiciary has had very little opportunity to interpret
these rules. Currently, Senator Joseph Biden has introduced
a bill into Congress which would repeal Rules 413-415 and
replace them with an amendment to Rule 404, as suggested
by the Judicial Conference. 53 The outcome is yet to be de-
termined.
245. See supra notes 32, 77 and accompanying text.
246. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92 (1994) (statement by Rep. Molinari).
Compare 139 CONG. REC. S15072-3 (1993), with 137 CONG. REC. S3238-42
(1991).
247. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 101, § III.
248. See supra note 246.
249. As an example of such an amendment, see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 101, § IV.
250. See discussion supra Part II.A-B.
251. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
252. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
253. McLaughlin, supra note 91, at 11-12.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415 demonstrate
the negative implications of Congress creating legislation for
political purposes.254 Such legislation tends to have little sub-
stantive foundation, and, in this case, the new rules clearly
create more problems than they solve.25
With these rules, Congress can now show the public that
it has taken steps to get tough on crime.2 6 Unfortunately,
the public only sees the face of this legislation rather than its
impact. With this politically-appealing legislation, Congress
has attempted to throw out hundreds of years of common law
and replace it with rules that are directly contrary to judicial
standards." ' Thus, the end result is that the judiciary is left
to work with two sets of rules that, as drafted, cannot coex-
ist.2
58
Michael S. Ellis
254. See discussion supra Part W.A.
255. See discussion supra Part IV.A-B.
256. See discussion supra Part IV.A-B.
257. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
258. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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